{{ app_name }} | Verifiable proofs

Why this page? B2B security reviews always start with the same question: « how do I verify what you are claiming? ». This page is our standard answer. Every line is anchored in a verifiable fact.

The statuses: Delivered are active in production today; In progress = feature merged, not yet enabled in production; Upcoming = dated commitment for a later release; Documented = assumed architectural choice, explained.

The AGPL-3.0-or-later source code is public on github.com/aegirex/server (SaaS), github.com/aegirex/website (marketing site) and github.com/aegirex/extension (browser extensions). The runbooks and internal procedures remain reserved for design partners under NDA.

1. Zero-knowledge and cryptography

The heart of the promise: we cannot read your secrets, even with administrator access to the server.

Promise	Proof	Status
OpenPGP.js v6 (SEIPDv2 + ChaCha20-Poly1305) browser-side	Library vendored with a SHA-256 fingerprint verified at build time (SRI integrity manifest). The application wrapper produces a publicly documented v2 JSON envelope.	Delivered
Private key never transmitted to the server	The authentication and session APIs accept only the public key. The private key stays in the browser's local storage and the user's hardware vault (passkey).	Delivered
Argon2id for the master password (RFC 9106)	Parameters: 256 MiB of memory, 5 passes, parallelism 4. Automated CI tests check these parameters at every release to prevent a silent regression.	Delivered
At-rest encryption of sensitive secrets server-side	XChaCha20-Poly1305 (key managed via environment variable, never in the database). Covers TOTP secrets, webhooks and other sensitive technical data.	Delivered
Web, browser extension roundtrip tested	An automated test verifies web encryption then extension decryption (and the reverse). It guarantees byte-for-byte compatibility between the surfaces. An end-to-end Playwright variant is planned.	In progress
Post-quantum migration (ML-KEM / ML-DSA)	Assessment planned. OpenPGP v6 + AES-256 remain estimated safe for 5 to 10 years according to the ANSSI RGS 2024.	Upcoming

2. Multi-organisation and API

One organisation can never read another's data, even with a valid API token.

Promise	Proof	Status
Strict isolation per organisation API-side	All endpoints systematically filter by the organisation associated with the token. A battery of cross-organisation isolation tests runs in CI on every commit to detect any potential leak.	Delivered
API tokens hashed with Argon2id, never stored in cleartext	The cleartext secret is displayed only once, at creation. There is no way to retrieve it afterwards. The database contains only the Argon2id hash.	Delivered
HMAC-SHA-256 audit chain (tamper-evidence in O(1))	Chained signature via atomic database lock. Verification available via a public command. Signing key isolated by an HSM module (PKCS#11). See the detailed explanation.	Delivered

3. Sovereignty and compliance

100% France or European Union, no CLOUD Act dependencies.

Promise	Proof	Status
Scaleway hosting in France (SecNumCloud trajectory targeted)	A single region in Île-de-France, three availability zones including one in a nuclear-proof bunker (DC3 Île-de-France). No replication outside the EU. Details on the trust page.	Delivered
Stancer payment (French company), no US provider	Integration being finalised on the KYB side for the opening of paid plans. Stancer is registered in France, outside CLOUD Act jurisdiction.	In progress
Brevo transactional emails (French company)	Strict SPF / DKIM / DMARC configuration applied to the domain, compliant with CNIL and Anti-phishing 2024 recommendations.	Delivered
GDPR: register, DPIA, contactable DPO	Privacy policy + signable DPA template + DPO reachable directly. Processing register kept up to date, DPIA available under NDA.	Delivered
Outside the CLOUD Act: exclusive French jurisdiction	ARDNTECH is French, the host is French, the subprocessors are French or European (see exhaustive list). No extra-European requisition can obtain anything other than unusable encrypted blobs.	Delivered

4. Open source and transparency

AGPL-3.0 code, reproducible builds, artefact signing.

Promise	Proof	Status
AGPL-3.0 source code (in full, including paid features)	AGPL-3.0-or-later licence on all the code, with a normalised SPDX header. Open public repositories: aegirex/server, aegirex/website, aegirex/extension.	Available
PHPStan static analysis level 9, zero error	The strictest level available. Blocking in CI: no merge if a new error is introduced.	Delivered
Automated test suite > 1,000 cases	Coverage: vault, API, authentication, 2FA, audit chain, GDPR export, import from competitors, multi-organisation isolation. Blocking in CI on every PR.	Delivered
Signed Docker image (Sigstore / cosign)	Lets the user verify the origin of the artefact before deployment, without prior trust in the distribution channel.	Upcoming
Downloadable and signed CycloneDX SBOM	Complete inventory of software dependencies per the NTIA/ENISA standard. Signed with Sigstore for integrity. Automated generation in CI at every release.	Upcoming

5. Assumed trade-offs

What we chose not to do, and why. Details in the public threat model.

Choice	Justification	Status
Secret and folder names stored in cleartext server-side	Enables instant search and display of the tree structure without decryption on every navigation. The content remains end-to-end encrypted. Trade-off documented in the threat model.	Documented
Master password = the vault's only key (no recovery)	A direct consequence of strict zero-knowledge: if we could recover it, there would be a decryption path server-side. Mitigation: backup codes printed at creation, Shamir sharing (M-of-N) upcoming for Enterprise plans.	Documented
Password in cleartext in the DOM during entry	Unavoidable: the user has to type it. Mitigation: Trusted Types CSP prevents DOM XSS from injecting JavaScript that exfiltrates field content.	Documented
Phishing of the master password via a clone site	No password withstands a perfectly cloned phishing site. Strong mitigation upcoming: WebAuthn PRF passkeys that remove the transmission of the password, and are bound to the origin domain by the browser.	Documented
ARDNTECH insider (future employee)	Contractual and organisational mitigation: NDA, separation of duties, mandatory code review, tamper-evident audit chain, principle of least privilege. An assumed limit of any SaaS publisher trust model.	Documented

The full details?

Everything above is a summary. For the exhaustive version with the STRIDE grid per surface, the modelled actors and every justified trade-off, read the public threat model.

Public threat model Code access (NDA)

For each promise, a proof.