ARDNTECH is a zero-knowledge B2B vault whose every cryptographic choice is documented and traceable to a published standard. The code is fully public under AGPL-3.0, hosted in Paris under French jurisdiction, and the HMAC-SHA-256 audit chain is verifiable via command line by an external auditor. This page summarises the crypto stack, the formalised threat model and the steps for a CISO to form a well-founded opinion without having to trust us.
The security architecture rests on three cumulative properties. Each is publicly documented, technically verifiable and contractually enforceable. None of the three depends on trusting the vendor.
OpenPGP.js v6 encryption runs in the browser before any server transmission. The private key never leaves the user's device. A complete database dump is unusable: the server only sees opaque blobs. No subpoena can force us to hand over a secret in clear, by design.
Every sensitive action is logged and sealed by a chained HMAC-SHA-256 per RFC 2104. The HMAC key is isolated from the application database. Any retroactive tampering breaks the chain and is detected in O(1) by recomputation. A public command lets your CISO verify journal integrity without depending on a vendor binary.
Hosted in Paris across three availability zones, one in an anti-nuclear bunker, under French jurisdiction, operated by ARDNTECH. The source code is published under AGPL-3.0, including paid features. Self-hosting is supported via Docker Compose or Kubernetes, with no mandatory outbound telemetry.
No home-grown primitives, no proprietary algorithms, no dependency on a third-party cloud KMS or external HSM. The table below summarises the technical choices and the standards they map to. The public cryptographic whitepaper details each row.
| Usage | ARDNTECH primitive | Reference standard |
|---|---|---|
| Asymmetric encryption | X25519 for key exchange, Ed25519 for signatures | RFC 7748 and RFC 8032 |
| Symmetric encryption | AES-256-GCM in SEIPDv2 OpenPGP mode | RFC 9580 (OpenPGP V6) |
| Master key derivation | Argon2id: 5 passes, 256 MiB memory, parallelism 4 | RFC 9106 |
| Server password hashing | Argon2id with hardened parameters | RFC 9106 |
| Audit chain and webhook signature | Chained HMAC-SHA-256, isolated key | RFC 2104 and RFC 6234 |
| Random number generation | crypto.getRandomValues browser-side, libsodium server-side | W3C Web Crypto and NIST SP 800-90A |
| Client cryptographic library | OpenPGP.js v6.3 or higher, vendored and SRI-pinned | Independent Cure53 audit |
| Constant-time comparison | hash_equals and password_verify server-side | OWASP ASVS v4 §6 |
The ARDNTECH architecture depends neither on a US cloud KMS, nor on a third-party HSM billed by usage, nor on a server-wrapping service under non-European jurisdiction. All sensitive operations take place either in the user's browser (encryption, decryption, signing) or in the server perimeter you control (hashing, random generation, audit chain). This is a deliberate architectural choice that simplifies the threat model and eliminates crypto sub-processors by design.
The standard audit log of a password manager is a classic application log stored in the database. Its evidential value rests entirely on trusting the vendor. ARDNTECH builds something different: a cryptographic chain independently verifiable by a PASSI or a forensic expert, from a simple frozen copy of the database.
Each logged action (create, modify, view, share, revoke a secret, log in, configure SSO, trigger panic mode) is deterministically serialised and then sealed by an HMAC-SHA-256 that includes the HMAC of the previous event. The HMAC key is isolated from the database and rotatable. Any retroactive insert, modification or deletion breaks the chain for all subsequent events.
A public verification command lets any auditor with a copy of the database recompute the full chain and report the first discontinuity. This command can run as a scheduled task on your infrastructure and feed your SIEM with a positive integrity event or a typed alert. AGPL-3.0 source code, executable without a vendor-supplied binary.
US consumer solutions and most European team vault vendors have a classic application audit log, modifiable by an administrator with direct database access. To our knowledge, no player in the competitive panel offers a cryptographic audit chain verifiable via a public command line. The reason is mainly architectural: retrofitting such a chain onto an existing product requires rewriting the event model and storage strategy. ARDNTECH made this choice at design time. The HMAC audit chain dedicated page details the technical construction, verification procedure and CISO, NIS2 and forensic use cases.
The ARDNTECH secrets manager threat model applies STRIDE (Microsoft) and LINDDUN (KU Leuven) methodologies per component. The detailed version is published in the technical documentation. The overview below summarises what is protected and what is not, without euphemism.
The ARDNTECH secrets manager threat model decomposes the system into eight components: user browser, application server, relational database, cache, transactional messaging, webhook receivers, planned browser extension, reference self-host deployment. For each, a STRIDE matrix lists spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege threats, with likelihood, severity and mitigation. A complementary LINDDUN matrix covers privacy threats (linkability, identifiability, detectability, disclosure, non-compliance). Full documentation is shared on request as part of an accompanied CISO audit.
Your CISO has four independent levers to qualify the architecture. None depends on trusting the vendor. None requires an NDA. None needs our team's involvement to start.
Your CISO can download the full codebase, including Team and Business features, from the public GitHub repository. The cryptographic whitepaper points to the sensitive files to review first. Allow two to four hours for a targeted review of the crypto routines.
Your CISO can run the verification command on a frozen export of a pilot instance's database. The command recomputes the full HMAC chain and stops at the first discontinuity. Runs offline, without connecting to any ARDNTECH service.
The official Docker images aim for end-to-end reproducibility. Your CISO can rebuild the image from source and compare the digest with the published one. This step detects any supply-chain injection upstream of the registry.
Your CISO can commission an ANSSI-listed audit provider for an independent review. ARDNTECH supplies the whitepaper, repository access and security lead support, with no confidentiality clause blocking the final report.
ARDNTECH is designed in France, operated by ARDNTECH, hosted in metropolitan France. GDPR rights are technically implemented, not merely promised contractually.
Right to portability (Art. 20)
Full JSON export of your vault, including encrypted secrets with their audit metadata. Documented format, re-importable into any compatible instance. No proprietary lock-in.
Right to object (Art. 21)
HIBP scan opt-out, product telemetry opt-out, marketing notifications opt-out. Normal vault operation depends on no optional processing.
Right to erasure (Art. 17)
Cascade deletion of account, personal vaults and memberships. Anonymised one-way hashes remain in the audit chain for legal traceability, in accordance with Art. 17 §3.b GDPR.
Right of access (Art. 15)
Export of all personal data held about you, excluding plaintext which is never in the vendor's possession. SLA: 30 days, GDPR-compliant.
Appointed DPO. The Data Protection Officer's contact details are published on the legal notices page. The privacy policy details the processing activities, retention periods and associated legal bases.
ARDNTECH was designed to fit into French sectoral frameworks. Depending on your industry, several levers are available today to meet your requirements: certified partner cloud, self-hosting at an already-qualified operator, or air-gap deployment.
SecNumCloud qualification is a target for ARDNTECH Cloud. In the meantime, the AGPL-3.0 licence allows immediate deployment at an already-qualified third-party SecNumCloud operator (OVHcloud, Outscale, Cloud Temple...).
Self-hosting at your own qualified HDS provider today. A partner HDS Cloud is planned on the healthcare trajectory horizon, subject to signing a partner HDS provider and a specific DPA.
Air-gap architecture possible on internal infrastructure, AGPL-3.0 code auditable to crypto level, HMAC audit chain for traceability enforceable against sectoral authorities, continuous SIEM CEF/LEEF/OCSF/Syslog export.
Appointed DPO, Art. 15/17/20 rights implemented in console, France hosting outside non-European jurisdiction. The CLOUD Act alternative page details the legal positioning.
ARDNTECH commits to an annual audit programme and publishes its cryptographic dependencies with their audit status. No home-grown crypto, no proprietary primitives: everything is traceable to a standard and a published independent audit.
If you identify a security flaw, report it before making it public. ARDNTECH commits to precise timelines, will not pursue any researcher acting in good faith, and publishes a hall of fame to credit valid reports.
Reporting channel
Address: dpo@aegirex.eu. A public PGP key is available to encrypt your report. The /.well-known/security.txt file conforming to RFC 9116 centralises contact details and the disclosure policy.
Timeline commitments
Acknowledgement within 48 business hours. Remediation plan communicated within 14 days. Coordinated fix published within 90 days maximum. Researcher credit in the public hall of fame, unless otherwise requested.
Safe harbour
No legal action is taken against a researcher acting in good faith: respect of the announced scope, no exfiltration of third-party data, no voluntary denial of service, disclosure before going public.
Out of scope
User phishing, support social engineering, volumetric denial of service, findings from automated tools only without manual validation. See the trust page for details.
The eight questions most frequently asked when qualifying the ARDNTECH architecture by a CISO, a CTO or a PASSI auditor.
Three reads are enough. The cryptographic whitepaper lists the primitives used (OpenPGP.js v6 with X25519/Ed25519, Argon2id at 256 MiB of memory, AES-256-GCM SEIPDv2, HMAC-SHA-256). This security page summarises the formalised threat model. The AGPL-3.0 source code on GitHub is fully readable, including Business features. A tech-savvy CISO can form a well-founded opinion in under an hour, without signing any NDA.
Yes. The AGPL-3.0 licence allows self-hosting without restriction. The reference deployment is documented in Docker Compose and Kubernetes. No outbound telemetry is required for normal operation: version checks, HIBP signature updates and product notifications are opt-in. An air-gap deployment for an OIV operator or a defence site is technically supported. See the self-hosting page for details.
Asymmetric: X25519 for key exchange and Ed25519 for signatures, per RFC 7748 and 8032. Symmetric: AES-256-GCM in SEIPDv2 mode per RFC 9580 OpenPGP. Derivation: Argon2id at 5 passes, 256 MiB of memory, parallelism 4, per RFC 9106. Audit: chained HMAC-SHA-256 per RFC 2104. Random generation: crypto.getRandomValues browser-side and random_bytes server-side via libsodium.
OpenPGP.js v6 underwent an independent audit by Cure53, a German firm recognised for offensive security and cryptographic review. The report is public. ARDNTECH pins version 6.3 or higher and applies an SRI strategy to the bundle delivered to the browser. No proprietary crypto module has been developed in-house: all primitives come from published, community-reviewed libraries.
Each logged event contains a timestamp, the actor identifier, the resource identifier and an HMAC-SHA-256 computed over the concatenation of the current line and the previous HMAC. The HMAC key is isolated from the database. Any retroactive insert, modification or deletion breaks the chain and is detected by recomputation. A public verification command lets an external auditor verify chain integrity without depending on a vendor-supplied binary. Technical detail on the HMAC audit chain page.
ARDNTECH is a French company, hosted in Paris across three availability zones, one in an anti-nuclear bunker. No sub-processor holds the users' private keys, which never leave their browser. An extra-European subpoena via mutual legal assistance could only obtain useless encrypted blobs. The AGPL-3.0 code also allows deployment in the jurisdiction of your choice. See CLOUD Act alternative and vault hosted in France.
The ARDNTECH threat model applies STRIDE (Microsoft) and LINDDUN (KU Leuven) methodologies per component: browser, application server, database, cache, transactional messaging, outbound webhooks, browser extension, self-host deployment. The main protected scenarios are server compromise, judicial subpoena, insider attacker and exfiltration via third-party provider. Accepted trade-offs (device compromise, master password loss, phishing) are documented plainly. Full documentation is shared on request as part of an accompanied CISO audit.
Send your report to dpo@aegirex.eu, ideally encrypted with the PGP key published in the /.well-known/security.txt file conforming to RFC 9116. Commitments: acknowledgement within 48 business hours, remediation plan within 14 days, coordinated fix published within 90 days maximum. A public hall of fame credits researchers who produced a valid report. No legal action is taken against a researcher acting in good faith.
Read the code, run the audit chain verification on an export of your instance, commission an ANSSI-listed PASSI. ARDNTECH supports you in the process, shares the cryptographic whitepaper and provides repository access without a blocking NDA. The cost of a well-founded opinion on this architecture is a few hours of your security team, not a six-month sales cycle.
